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Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00933R000100290006-6

11 May 1981

6/00
ODP # 81-643

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

VIA : Inspector General

FROM :
Acting Director of PersonnelSUBJECT : Action Taken on Report of Audit Appraisal,
Human Resources System

Handwritten:
 HRS
 CI
 PR-A/C/MS
 DD/PAC
 DD/A/S/m
 0/0/ODP File
 (or MS)

1. I have reviewed the Report of Audit Appraisal, Human Resources System (HRS) of 31 March 1981. The HRS represents the development of a complex computer system and since its acceptance and activation in March of 1980, it has been used successfully, proving to be an accurate integrated centralized personnel information system responsive to Agency management requirements. The scope of the audit and the several findings are reasonable, constructive, and acceptable.

2. Our actions and responses to the audit comments and recommendations are keyed to the report.

Recommendation #1: Formally designate a data base manager for the HRS and give him final approval authority for all changes to the HRS.

The Chief, Information Division is designated as the Data Base Manager of the HRS with responsibility for changes, interfaces, and access to the HRS. (Note: Chief, ID was not interviewed during the audit.) Supplementing this designation is the alignment and utilization of Chief, Automated Data Resources Branch (ADRB) as the, Technical Data Base Manager, participating in the development and servicing of the data structure relevant to the software, testings, and system program implementation. This combination is a satisfactory and practical arrangement since Chief, Information Division, as DBM, confers and consults daily with Chief, ADRB and Chief, Information and Analysis Branch (IAB) for purposes of discussing system applications, changes, controls, requirements, and resolution of problems. Chief, ID, by this routine, is fully cognizant of HRS activity with complete confidence in actions proposed and taken by C/ADRB and C/IAB. However, in furtherance of the audit recommendation, all requests for changes to the HRS (workorders) will be approved and signed by Chief, ID as

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DBM, after impact assessment with C/ADRB and C/IAB, as appropriate. In the absence of C/ID, the C/ADRB, as Technical DBM, will insure system continuity and IAB compatibility for HRS modifications, and sign workorders as needed.

Recommendation #2: Document in writing ADRB's testing and approval of software changes. The documentation should include as a minimum: the name of the individual testing the changes, the results obtained, the date of the test, the date of the approval, and the signature of the individual approving implementation of the change.

Hard copy backup of testing information is maintained by ADRB and contains the documentation noted in Recommendation #2, but only a verbal approval to execute the change was given to ODP. This procedure has been changed to conform to the audit recommendation with ADRB giving ODP written approval for implementing software changes.

Recommendation #3: Require prior written approval from the DBM or other designated individuals for changes to the Common Validation Dictionaries.

Changes to COMVAD are controlled very closely with review and assessment of the requested change(s) by C/ADRB. All requests are documented by ADRB and retained indefinitely (COMVAD audits are held for at least one year). Changes to COMVAD will be made only after C/ADRB or the DBM has placed signed approval on the documented request.

Recommendation #4: Request the ODP to modify the HRS so that security violation notices reject the transaction at time of entry and such notices are recorded for subsequent review and appropriate follow-up.

ODP Production Division has been requested, by memorandum to have the system reject improper requests for data and to send daily listing of all security code violations issued by HRS-2 to ADRB for review and follow-up as appropriate. (Copy attached).

Recommendation #5: Periodically review the access list and update as required.

Operators on HRS data base have been reviewed; adds, changes, and deletes have been made to align the data base, and signed user authorization lists have been sent to each branch having HRS-2 users. A quarterly review will be made to keep the lists current.

Recommendation #6 (For ODP): Follow established procedures to ensure that backup copies of HRS files are stored offsite in a timely manner.

ODP Production Division has been requested, by memorandum, to conform with this recommendation. (Copy attached).

Recommendation #7: Determine whether MINI-GAP can be used in lieu of manual posting of Service Record Cards.

Although the Mini-GAP program contains data which is applicable to Service Record Cards (SCR/SF-7) purposes, it is data only from July 1975 forward. Moreover, configuration of the Mini-GAP file is not conducive (cost effective) to automated production of the SRC. Automated production of the SRC was planned as a component and function of the General Archives Program (GAP) -- a storage and retrieval system of history and personnel information from 1968 forward. Time and resource impasses necessitated the suspension of GAP development. However, its completion and applications, including elimination of manual posting of the SRC, remain objectives which regrettably, at this time, are overtaken by higher priority commitments.

Comment to Para 14:

Security has been tested and installed on the race and handicap codes and the true name values on the production data base. These codes/values have been protected previously but they are now available to fewer system users.

3. The appraisal was helpful and balanced, and I am appreciative of the efforts and consideration extended by the auditors.



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Attachment: As stated

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - AD/OP
1 - C/ADRB
1 - C/ODP ✓
1 - C/IAB
1 - ID Chrono

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8 May 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Chief, Production Division, ODP

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FROM : [REDACTED]
Chief, Information Division, OP

SUBJECT : Compliance with the Audit of the Human
Resources System

1. The audit performed on the Human Resources System, (HRS) by the Information System Audit Division/Audit Staff, surfaced two areas of weakness in the overall strength of the HRS production environment. This memorandum will formalize Office of Personnel request to strengthen these areas:

- A. No record or notice of security violations is printed by the system. Improper requests for data from the HRS are not reported to the DBM or other appropriate officials.

REQUESTED ACTION:

The system generates "Security Code Violation" to users who exceed their authority to extract or update information on the HRS. The security violation notices should reject the transaction at the time of entry and I would like to obtain a listing on a daily basis of all security code violations issued by HRS2. The listing will be picked up the following morning and reviewed by OP/ADRB along with their review of the database statistics.

- B. Procedures for safeguarding the HRS data file have not been followed by ODP.

REQUESTED ACTION:

ODP should follow established procedures to insure that backup copies of HRS files are stored offsite in a timely manner. Copies of HRS data files are created every night; a copy of the cutoff date tapes are stored at GC-47 in case GS-03 is damaged; and, monthly tapes are sent [REDACTED] I would like to be assured that the procedures will be followed.

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2. The audit found that the HRS operates efficiently and is generally satisfying the needs of its users. Additionally, the personnel involved with the operation of the HRS were performing their assigned task in an effective manner. The service and fine performance of your Division certainly are a contribution to this effort and our accomplishments. Your assistance and support is greatly appreciated.



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